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Of Property Rights and Rights to Property 
JAMES E. KRIER* 
In 2004, President George W. Bush said, “I believe in private property 
so much, I want everyone in America to have some.”1  Much earlier, in 
1948, an economics professor from the University of Texas expressed the 
same sentiment in strikingly similar terms.  When asked by an investigatory 
committee of the Texas legislature whether he favored private property, he 
replied, “I do . . . and so strongly that I want everyone in Texas to have 
some.”2 
Even putting aside the possibility that the President’s speechwriters 
found inspiration in an unacknowledged source, there are several interesting 
things to note about these two statements.  More than a half-century stands 
between them.  One speaker, President Bush, was and is a Republican 
politician somewhat to the right.  The economist, in contrast, was a well-
known leftist.  Yet despite the distance between the two men in years and 
ideological outlooks, both seemed to endorse the property system and the 
wide distribution of property rights.  I am inclined to think that most 
Americans would express similar sentiments today, although the meanings 
they attach to their words might vary considerably when it comes down to 
particulars.  And regarding particulars, I am confident that there is much 
less contentiousness about the operation of the property system for any 
given distribution of rights then there is about what the actual distribution of 
 
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School.  The remarks here have been 
prompted by a conversation with (as opposed to a speech to) students and faculty of Ohio Northern 
University, Pettit College of Law, as part of the Dean’s Lecture Series.  I am grateful to Dean Rick Bales 
and the faculty and students of the law school for providing the opportunity to talk with them about 
property.  Two themes ran through our conversation: first, the importance of property rights, and, 
second, concerns about the distributive implications of property rights.  Those are the themes pursued 
here. 
 1. Remarks to the Republican Governors Association, 1 PUB. PAPERS 260 (Feb. 23, 2004).  
Bush repeated his views on private property in almost exactly the same words on seven subsequent 
occasions over the months of February through May 2004. See Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Luncheon in 
Louisville, 1 PUB. PAPERS 280 (Feb. 26, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Reception in Los Angeles, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 306 (Mar. 3, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Luncheon in Santa Clara, California, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 321 (Mar. 4, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Luncheon in Dallas, Texas, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
333 (Mar. 8, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Reception in Houston, Texas, 1 PUB. PAPERS 338 (Mar. 
8, 2004); Remarks at a Bush-Cheney Reception in East Meadow, New York, 1 PUB. PAPERS 369 (Mar. 
11, 2004); Remarks at the American Conservative Union 40th Anniversary Gala, 1 PUB. PAPERS 872 
(May 13, 2004). 
 2. DON CARLETON, RED SCARE: RIGHT-WING HYSTERIA, FIFTIES FANATICISM, AND THEIR 
LEGACY IN TEXAS 22 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
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rights should be.  In other words, property rights are one thing, and rights to 
property quite another. 
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS 
According to William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, written on the eve of the American Revolution and extraordinarily 
influential in the early legal history of the United States, “There is nothing 
which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property.”3  Property doctrine has changed a lot 
since Blackstone’s time, of course, but his words about property rights are, 
as Stuart Banner notes, “just as true today.”4   What accounts for mankind’s 
high regard for property? 
One view, supported by theory and evidence, suggests that in the course 
of natural evolution, respect for possession came to be hardwired into the 
human brain.  Nonhuman animals, runs the account, had found a 
reproductive advantage by behaving in the following manner: They 
defended items and territories in their possession, but deferred to those in 
the possession of others.5  Humans appear to have learned, early in their 
history, that it was advantageous to behave in the same manner, and 
especially after the invention of agriculture about ten millennia ago.6  
Interestingly, the de facto norm of deference to possession that developed 
among humans preceded the advent of governments and formal legal 
systems.  To be sure, the norm amounted to less than a full-blown de jure 
system of property rights, but it nevertheless provided the core concept—
recognition of a right in possessors to exclude others from their possessions.  
When governments and formal property systems did eventuate, virtually all 
of them adopted a right to exclude as a central feature of their property 
regimes.7 
Today, the right to exclude is generally regarded as the sine qua non of 
property.8  Notice that the right to exclude logically implies two other 
 
 3. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 4. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 2 
(2011). 
 5. See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). 
 6. For a full discussion of the leading literature, see James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and 
the Origin of Property, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 150-58 (2009).  The rise of agriculture also provoked 
the development of constructive possession, such that deference extended not just to things one actually 
possessed, but also to things carrying indicia of belonging to some person even though the person is 
absent for the moment, such as tilled fields. See id. at 158. 
 7. Hence the notion that possession is the root to title or the origin of property. See, e.g., Richard 
A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as 
the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985). 
 8. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 
(1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others . . . is the sine qua non.  Give someone the right to exclude . . . and 
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rights.  Namely, a right to use and a right to transfer to third parties.  After 
all, if there is a right (de facto or de jure) to exclude, that is equivalent to 
saying that owners are free to use what is theirs, and also free to convey 
what is theirs to others who thereby become the new owners with the same 
rights as the erstwhile ones.  All of these rights are in rem—they empower 
owners as against the world at large, providing, in Blackstone’s famous 
words, “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.”9 
No wonder humankind would find property an attractive institution.  
From the viewpoint of individuals, property provides owners a large degree 
of autonomy, privacy, and freedom within their domains.  From the 
viewpoint of society at large, it provides citizens with incentives to invest in 
resources, manage them in productive fashion, and transfer them to others 
as may suit their preferences. 
So property rights seem to be a very good thing—for those who have 
some. 
II. RIGHTS TO PROPERTY 
A.  In General 
We saw above that voices from across the political spectrum claim that 
they approve of property so much that they want everyone to have some, 
but (as also noted earlier) it is not at all clear what these words might mean 
to any particular person who expresses such a sentiment.10  For example, 
someone like President Bush would probably approve of property even if 
not everyone has some, whereas the economist from the University of Texas 
might approve of property only if everyone has some.  In any event, it is not 
saying much to endorse a property system so long as it provides “some” 
property for everyone without explaining how much property, and of what 
kinds.  Jeremy Waldron has concluded, after the most careful scrutiny, 
“there is no right-based argument to be found which provides an adequate 
justification for a society in which some people have lots of property and 
 
you give them property.  Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property”).  The right 
to exclude may be shared.  Suppose, for example, a limited-access commons owned by 100 people as 
tenants in common.  No common owner may exclude any other common owner, but may exclude 
anyone else.  A limited-access commons, then, is common property as among the commoners, but 
private property as between the common owners and the rest of the world.  (Bear in mind, then, that 
“private” property is not limited to sole proprietorship, meaning a single owner.)  A universal commons 
is not a kind of property at all, because by definition everyone has a right of access and thus no one has a 
right to exclude. 
 9. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 10. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
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many have next to none.”11  In other words, even if we can find justification 
for a system of private property, this does not mean we can find justification 
for any old system, without regard to its particular content.  President Bush 
was speaking of property for everyone in the context of advocating various 
initiatives on his administration’s agenda to support home ownership, small 
business ownership, private retirement accounts, and health care accounts.  
What the economist’s program (if any) might have been, I do not know, but 
I expect it would be along the lines of property for everyone sufficient to 
provide a decent life for each person, which seems not to have been on 
Bush’s agenda. 
There is a contemporary philosophical literature endorsing a right to 
property of roughly the sort I have imagined the Texas economist favoring.  
Stephen Munzer, for instance, argues that property systems—even systems 
where some have more property than others—are justifiable only if “(1) 
everyone has a minimum amount of property and (2) the inequalities do not 
undermine a fully human life in society.”12  Munzer refers to the first clause 
as the Floor Thesis and the latter as the Gap Thesis.13  Under the Floor 
Thesis, the minimum property holdings rightly required might vary with the 
society or culture in question, but must provide personal items, food, 
shelter, and funds for or access to education and health care in amounts 
sufficient to satisfy basic human needs and ensure the development of basic 
human capabilities.14  The Gap Thesis is harder to summarize in a few 
words, but its essence is as follows: Even if everyone has the required 
minimum property holdings, large gaps between the best off and the worst 
off are still unjustifiable if they “interfere[] with appropriate amounts of 
control, privacy, and individuality, with the development of property-related 
virtues, and with the opportunities for meaningful work.”15  Munzer 
mentions various examples of what he has in mind: Extreme and visible 
inequalities can lower self-esteem and create understandable resentment, be 
an affront to a sense of equal moral worth, and distort the operations of legal 
and political processes.16 
B.  Snapshots of Some Data 
How does the United States measure up in terms of the foregoing?  
Begin with the Floor Thesis and consider the country’s poverty rate.  
Although there is contention about the way the federal government 
 
 11. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1988). 
 12. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 227 (1990). 
 13. Id. at 229. 
 14. See id. at 244-46. 
 15. Id. at 247-48. 
 16. See id. at 249. 
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calculates the poverty threshold, and thus the poverty rate, in essence the 
rate indicates the percentage of the population with insufficient income (not 
including capital gains or noncash benefits from government programs) to 
purchase the food, clothing, health care, and shelter needed to meet the 
minimum threshold standards.  The official poverty rate in 2013 was 
14.5%.17  Almost 44% of this group (about twenty million people) lived in 
families with incomes below one-half of their poverty threshold.18  The 
poverty rate for children under the age of eighteen was 19.9%, the good 
news being that this was a decline from 21.8% in 2012,19 the bad news 
being that the United States nevertheless ranks among the worst in 
developed countries.20  One final statistic regarding poverty in the United 
States: The number of homeless people—people with no private place to 
call their own—in 2013 was estimated to be about nineteen out of every ten 
thousand people.21 
Turn now to the Gap Thesis, which refers to the difference between 
people with a lot and people with very little.  According to a recent report, 
inequality regarding both income (how much you make) and wealth (how 
much you have) has been on the increase in the United States.22  The top 
10% of earners garnered half of overall income in 2012, the highest 
proportion since records have been kept.23  As to wealth, in 2013, the top 
10% held about 75%,24 the top 3% about 54.4%,25 and the top 1% about 
36%.26  Even those in the top 1% suffered inequality of a sort: “the 
wealthiest 0.1 percent, and especially the 0.01 percent, have left the rest of 
the 1 percent in the dust.”27 
 
 17. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 12 (2014). 
 18. Id. at 16. 
 19. Id. at 12. 
 20. See Christopher Ingraham, Child poverty in the U.S. is among the worst in the developed 
world, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2 
014/10/29/child-poverty-in-the-u-s-is-among-the-worst-in-the-developed-world/. 
 21. NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 
2014, at 9, n.2 (2014).  For discussion of homelessness and the extraordinary limitations it imposes on 
individual freedom, see Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
295 (1991). 
 22. See Annie Lowrey, The Wealth Gap in America Is Growing, Too, N.Y. TIMES (April 2, 2014, 
10:15 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/the-wealth-gap-is-growing-too/?_r=0 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Top 10 percent of US households control nearly 75 percent of all wealth, MY BUDGET 
360, http://www.mybudget360.com/wealth-inequality-america-top-10-percent-of-us-households-control-
75-percent-of-wealth/ (last visited May 28, 2015). 
 25. See Wealth Inequality, INEQUALITY.ORG, http://inequality.org/wealth-inequality (last visited 
May 28, 2015) (“The top 3 percent now hold over double the wealth of America’s poorest 90 percent of 
families”). 
 26. See Aimee Picchi, The “1 percent” are richer than you thought, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2014, 
12:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-1-percent-are-richer-than-you-thought/. 
 27. Lowrey, supra note 22.  In this connection, consider a recent article, Thomas Piketty & 
Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in the Long Run, 344 SCIENCE 838 (2014), reporting that wealth and income 
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Recall that in speaking of his Gap Thesis, Munzer suggested that 
extreme and visible inequalities between the best off and the worst off are 
unjustifiable if they lower self-esteem and create understandable 
resentment.28  In that connection, let me mention a few recent items from 
the news reporting on the rich versus the poor in New York City.  The first 
item has to do with housing, which is very expensive in The Big Apple and 
in short supply for low-income residents.  A report bearing the title “Don’t 
Let Rich People Own Apartments They Don’t Live In” asserts that 
“thousands of spacious New York apartments are bought and held by 
wealthy people who do not actually live in them.  They are used instead as 
wildly expensive substitutes for hotels.”29  At the same time, the City “has 
54,000 people living in homeless shelters and a public housing system with 
a waiting list of a quarter-million people and $18 billion in unfunded budget 
needs.”30 
New York City has an Inclusionary Housing Program that permits 
developers to build larger-than-usual residential projects if, as part of the 
project, they also provide low-income housing, on-site or off-site.31  One 
recently approved development has on-site affordable housing, but low-
income residents must use a different entrance than the one provided for 
their rich neighbors, perhaps to spare the latter “‘from the terrible 
awkwardness of regularly encountering people whose lifestyles differ from 
theirs, or something.’”32  Yes, perhaps, but consider also the scheme from 
 
distributions at the top of the distribution are fractal in nature, meaning that patterns seen in examining, 
say, the share of the top 10% as compared to the bottom 90% repeat themselves in an increasingly more 
fine grained pattern: the wealth of the top 1% increases faster than the wealth of the top 10%, the wealth 
of the top 0.1% faster than that of the top 1%, the wealth of the top 0.01% faster  than that of the top 
0.1%, and so on.  See also Neil Irwin, The $179 Million Picasso That Explains Global Inequality, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/upshot/the-179-million-picasso-that-explain 
s-global-inequality.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (drawing conclusions from Piketty and Saez’s article 
regarding wealth inequality). 
 28. See MUNZER, supra note 12, at 249. 
 29. Hamilton Nolan, Don’t Let Rich People Own Apartments They Don’t Live In, GAWKER.COM 
(Aug. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://gawker.com/don’t-let-rich-people-own-apartments-they-don’t-live-in-
1621527767.  According to a New York magazine article (with the title “Stash Pad”) mentioned in the 
Gawker.com story, “[t]he Census Bureau estimates that 30 percent of all apartments in the quadrant from 
49th to 70th Streets between Fifth and Park are vacant at least ten months a year.” Andrew Rice, Stash 
Pad, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Jun. 29, 2014), http://nymag.com/news/features/foreigners-hiding-money-new-
york-real-estate-2014-6/index1.html. 
 30. Nolan, supra note 29. 
 31. See generally Zoning Tools: Inclusionary Housing, NYC Planning, NYC.GOV, http://www.n 
yc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zh_inclu_housing.shtml (last visited May 28, 2015). 
 32. Lucy Westcott, New York City Approves ‘Poor Door’ for Luxury Apartment Building, 
NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2014 5:49 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-city-approves-poor-door-
luxury-apartment-building-260218 (quoting Caroline Bankoff, Fancy Upper West Side Building Will 
Have a Separate Door for Poor People, N.Y. MAGAZINE (July 21, 2014 4:12 PM), http://nymag.com/da 
ily/intelligencer/2014/07/building-will-have-a-separate-door-for-poor.html). 
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the viewpoint of the low-income residents, regularly and publicly identified 
as people of lower status. 
A second item: Auction prices for fine art have soared unbelievably as 
of late.  The New York Times reported that Christie’s sold more than $1 
billion worth of art in three days in early May 2015, in “a spectacle of 
excess at the highest level,” according to one observer.33  The reporter saw 
the event as “a symptom of widening income inequality” and a reflection of 
the popularity of expensive art as a “status symbol,”34 just as are separate 
entrances for the wealthy (indicating high status) and the poor (low status). 
Across the world and over a long period of human history, the sorts of 
affronts worked by conspicuous consumption were the target of sumptuary 
laws, defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] statute, ordinance, or 
regulation that limits the expenditures that people can make for personal 
gratification or ostentatious display.”35  Sumptuary laws are pretty much 
unknown today (although we can see distant relatives, such as luxury taxes 
on the purchase of fancy automobiles).  However justified they might be 
thought to be, they are unlikely to be revived.  People offended by the 
prevailing distribution of rights to property in the United States will have to 
look elsewhere for reform.  A pertinent question is whether the law of 
property provides a means. 
C. Property Law and Rights to Property 
In considering this issue, it is important to bear in mind that property 
law viewed as a system has two components.  The first has to do with the 
body of doctrine governing the rights of people who are owners; the second 
has to do with the distribution of the right to be owners.  So, for example, 
under the early common law property system, married women had 
essentially no rights to own property, but this was eventually changed by 
Married Women’s Property Acts, such that now women have the same 
ownership rights as men.36  Modern property doctrine treats women just as 
it treats owners generally—in an evenhanded fashion.   Yet notice that the 
early common law system likewise treated all owners in an evenhanded 
fashion, but happened to declare that married women could not be owners. 
The Married Women’s Property Acts, then, did not change the first 
component of the property system, but did change the second by working a 
 
 33. Scott Reyburn, Christie’s Has Art World’s First $1 Billion Week, Widening Divide With 
Sotheby’s, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/arts/design/art-auction-sale 
s-at-christies-top-1-billion-this-week.html (internal quotations omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009).  For a general account on sumptuary law, 
see ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY LAW (1996). 
 36. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 384-85 (8th ed. 2014). 
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fundamental redistribution of the right to be an owner.  There have been 
arguments advanced over the years to make other fundamental changes of a 
similar sort—for example, by way of a constitutional right to the minimal 
entitlements necessary to a decent life.37  But no such constitutional right 
has been created by constitutional amendment or recognized by the 
Supreme Court.  Legislation provides another means of reform, but nothing 
fundamental has been enacted and, especially at the federal level, is 
impossible to imagine given the divisive political climate. 
An alternative approach is to argue for judicial reform of the common 
law property system.  Arguments of this sort have been around for some 
years.  Morris Cohen, a legal philosopher, acknowledged in an article 
written on the eve of the Great Depression that “the essence of private 
property is always the right to exclude others,”38 but he maintained that this 
right “must be supported by restrictions or positive duties on the part of the 
owners, enforced by the state as much as the right to exclude others . . . .”39  
Some 50 years later, C.B. Macpherson argued in a similar vein that the right 
not to be excluded was as much the essence of property as the right to 
exclude.40 
Viewpoints like those of Cohen and Macpherson might seem to 
represent a radical reformation of Blackstone’s notion of property as “sole 
and despotic dominion,”41 but that is hardly the case.  Blackstone’s 
statement was misleading even in his own day, as he well knew.  In an 
earlier, less well-known passage of his Commentaries, he observed that the 
right of property in an owner “consists in the free use, enjoyment, and 
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only 
by the laws of the land,”42 which imposed any number of limitations on the 
rights to exclude, use, and transfer.43  Thus, Cohen and Macpherson’s ideas 
were entirely consistent with the common law principles of private 
ownership. 
This can be said as well of a current round of scholarship that echoes to 
some degree the views of Cohen and Macpherson.  I refer to it as the 
 
 37. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum 
Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525 (1993) (discussing the arguments and obstacles the poor 
confront). 
 38. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 12 (1927). 
 39. Id. at 21. 
 40. C.B. MACPHERSON, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 201 (1978). 
 41. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 42. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (emphasis added). 
 43. See, e.g., Frederick G. Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in NOMOS XXII: 
PROPERTY 101, 119-24 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (discussing limitations on 
property rights during Blackstone’s time, such as those arising from the law of nuisance, exceptions to 
trespass, the right of the sovereign to expropriate, rules of inheritance, and so forth); see also David B. 
Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEOR. INQ. L. 103 (2009). 
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Progressive Property movement, because some of its chief contributors refer 
to it that way in A Statement of Progressive Property.44  Here are the 
highpoints of that statement: 
 The common conception of property as protection of 
individual control over valued resources is both 
intuitively and legally powerful.  Sometimes the 
expression of this idea focuses on the right to exclude 
others and sometimes on the free use of what one owns. 
. . . [These are] inadequate as the sole basis for 
resolving property conflicts or for designing property 
institutions. 
 Property implicates plural and incommensurable 
values. 
 Some of these values promote individual interests, 
wants, needs, desires, and preferences.  Some promote 
social interests, such as environmental stewardship, 
civil responsibility, and aggregate wealth.  Others 
govern human interaction to ensure that people relate to 
each other with respect and dignity. 
 These values are not solely a matter of satisfying 
personal preferences.  Values can generate moral 
demands and obligations. 
 Values promoted by property include life and human 
flourishing, the protection of physical security, the 
ability to acquire knowledge and make choices, and the 
freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms.  They 
also include wealth, happiness, and other aspects of 
individual and social well-being. 
 
 44. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. 
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009) [hereinafter A 
Statement of Progressive Property].  This item appears in a special issue of the Cornell Law Review, 
entitled Property and Obligation.  In my discussion, I focus mostly on one article in the issue, see 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
745 (2009).  Other works of interest in the progressive property vein, in addition to the articles within the 
special issue of the Cornell Law Review, include: GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY (2012); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE 
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS 
MEANING AND POWER (2003). 
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 Property confers power.  It allocates scarce resources 
that are necessary for human life, development, and 
dignity.  Because of the equal value of each human 
being, property laws should promote the ability of each 
person to obtain the material resources necessary for 
full social and political participation.45 
Notice that the Progressive Property statement adopts a vision of a just 
system of property similar to that set out by Professor Munzer.46  Also in 
accordance with Munzer, the Progressive Property scholarship devotes most 
of its pages to philosophical arguments in support of a property system that, 
as noted in the last paragraph of the Statement of Progressive Property 
quoted just above, aims to “promote the ability of each person to obtain the 
material resources necessary for full social and political participation.”47  
However, the scholarship gives little concrete attention to the problem or 
problems that such a system is suppose to help solve.  For example, no data, 
such as that sketched in Section B above, is set out in the scholarship.  
Instead, there is simply an assumption that matters are not right.  Let us 
forgive this neglect of empiricism on the ground that reasonably fine-
grained attention to the facts is unnecessary because any intelligent citizen 
should know that there is a poverty problem in the United States.  The 
questions are why, and what to do about it. 
Judging at least from the Progressive Property literature of interest to 
me here, an important why is a certain prevailing academic mindset about 
property, and an important what to do is doctrinal change of a particular 
sort.  Regarding mindset, the culprit is law-and-economics, which, as 
Gregory Alexander rightly notes, “has dominated property scholarship” in 
recent years.48  He concedes that law-and-economics theory provides 
important insights, but finds it deeply flawed by “the poverty of its analysis 
of moral values and moral issues [and its] exclusive concern with aggregate 
social welfare . . . .”49  Its practitioners, in his view, focus too much on the 
rights of property owners and too little on their obligations—too much, in 
particular, on the right of owners to exclude, as opposed to the obligation of 
owners to others, both owners and non-owners.50  A better approach, in 
Alexander’s view, is to focus on what he calls a “social-obligation norm in 
American property law,”51 a norm that would recognize not just the right of 
 
 45. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 44, at 743-44. 
 46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 47. A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 44, at 744. 
 48. Alexander, supra note 44, at 750. 
 49. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 50. See id. at 747-48. 
 51. Id. at 748. 
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owners to exclude but also, as Macpherson put it earlier, “the right [in 
others] not to be excluded.”52 
Professor Alexander’s account is both normative and positive; it argues 
that the norm he has in mind should be the law, and that, to some degree, it 
is the law, although it appears “only sporadically and implicitly.”53  
Regarding the latter, his chief doctrinal examples include extended 
discussion of entitlement sacrifices worked by eminent domain and 
nuisance law, and use sacrifices worked by historic preservation regulations, 
environmental regulations, and rules placing limitations on the right to 
exclude (regarding public access to beaches, for example).54 
All of these examples could in my view be explained in terms of, say, 
the law-and-economics viewpoint, but I accept the social-obligation norm as 
an interesting competing viewpoint.  And to his credit, Alexander 
acknowledges that the viewpoint reflects considerable respect for protection 
of property rights in most cases.55  However, Alexander insists that 
“American property law is not solely about either individual freedom or 
cost-minimization.  It is also about human flourishing and supporting the 
communities that enable us to live well-lived lives.”56 
And so perhaps it is, but not yet in a way that grants rights to property 
of the sort I have been discussing.  If indeed the social-obligation norm is 
reflected in property law, it is mostly by way of limiting the rights of 
property owners.  The limitations, moreover, do little if anything to feed the 
hungry, shelter the homeless, clothe the cold, treat the ill, or educate the 
masses.  It is, to be sure, good that those in need have access to historic 
sites, to beaches and other recreational facilities, to public parks and streets, 
to a healthy natural environment, and so forth, but to observe that they 
thereby promote human flourishing is something of a joke, I reckon, to 
those dwelling below the poverty line—akin to telling people with 
inadequate means to nutritious meals that they are free to eat cake. 
When Macpherson wrote of an individual right not to be excluded by 
others, he had in mind a “right to equal access to the means of labour and/or 
the means of life.”57  I believe the Progressive Property scholars have 
essentially the same objective in mind, but limitations on the rights of 
property owners do not accomplish it.  Access to land owned by others is 
not the same as owning land oneself, especially in terms of autonomy.  This 
is the difference between rights of property owners and a right to be 
 
 52. MACPHERSON, supra note 40, at 201. 
 53. Alexander, supra note 44, at 748. 
 54. See id. at 773-810. 
 55. Id. at 815. 
 56. Id. at 818. 
 57. MACPHERSON, supra note 40, at 201. 
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property owners, and expanding the right to be property owners is 
something that the common law courts in their common law mode are 
extraordinarily unable to accomplish.  Revolution aside, such a fundamental 
redistribution of wealth will be achieved by the political system if it is 
achieved at all, and the prognosis is not promising.  In an essay published 
some years ago, Jean Baechler ventured the view that “the politics of 
redistribution, taken by itself, has every chance of falling to its lowest 
common denominator, namely, public relief of misery.”58  One could argue 
that this is what we see today, with not much likelihood of change.  A recent 
item in the New York Times points out that since the 1970s, wealth and 
income inequality has been on the rise, making it reasonable to suppose that 
public opinion favoring redistribution has been on the rise as well, but it has 
not: “Americans’ desire to soak the rich has diminished even as the rich 
have more wealth available that could, theoretically, be soaked.”59  So long 
as attitudes like this persist, there will be no fundamental right of everyone 
to own property.  Property law cannot rise above the culture in which it is 
embedded. 
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